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　1．Introduction
The mobile telecommunications industry has 
grown at a fairly high rate in the past decades, with 
advance in technology and service. The mobile 
telecommunications networks perform multi-sided 
platforms; for example, subscribers are connected 
to the networks on one side while content/
application service providers on the other (Ravivio 
& Luukkaine, 2011). The platforms are constituted 
by many interdependent components, and they are 
dynamic in their nature. 
Academic literature has provided various aspects 
to discuss the evolutional process of the mobile 
telecommunications industr y, concentrating on 
economic factors (e.g. Andonova, 2006; Gruber & 
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Verboven, 2001; Liikanen, Stoneman, & Toivanen, 
2004; Madden, Coble-Neal, & Dalzell, 2004; Massini, 
2004), value creation mechanisms (e.g. Li & 
Whalley, 2002; Maitland, Bauer, & Wester veld, 
2002; Sabat, 2002), regulatory policies (e.g. Casey 
& Töyli,2012; Vogelsang, 2017) , and the role of 
mobile handsets (Ono & Tang, 2010). Although 
these discussions individually contribute to deep 
understanding about specialised aspects of the 
evolutional process, more research especially from 
a holistic viewpoint is necessary. Co-evolutional 
approaches (e.g. Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Volberda 
& Lewin, 2003) emphasise that an evolutionary 
process of a constituent system involves mutual 
interactions among all relevant constituents and 
suggest that the character of the relative importance 
of the constituents should vary during its evolution 
process. Moreover, the literature on industr y 
evolution has endeavoured to characterise 
systematically industry dynamics by investigating 
change of individual firm performances, such as 
market share and profitability (e.g., Lenox, Scott & 
Lewin, 2007).  Along the lines of these approaches, this 
paper takes the Japanese mobile telecommunications 
industry as a case and quantitatively investigates 
how the mobile network service evolution, especially 
caused through the advancement of mobile wireless 
technologies and mobile handset functions, 
influences business performances of the mobile 
network carries.  
In the Japanese mobile telecommunications 
industr y, the evolution of the mobile network 
services can be classified into four phases: voice-
based services, mobile Internet services, high-
speed data services, and sophisticated application 
services specialised for smart-phones. These phase 
shifts have brought change in the competition 
structure of the industry and caused turbulence in 
market shares and profitability of mobile network 
carries. In Japan, there are three dominant mobile 
network car riers having dif ferent business 
backgrounds: NTT DoCoMo (hereafter DoCoMo), 
KDDI-au (hereafter KDDI), and Softbank. DoCoMo, 
a genuine mobile network operator spun off from 
NTT in 1991, has been the largest in the Japanese 
market and is renowned for eminent technology in 
wireless communications as well as the i-Mode. It is 
the first operator to launch 3G and 4G mobile 
wireless technology service in the Japanese market 
while the last to offer the iPhone, the most popular 
s m a r t p h o n e  b r a n d  i n  J a p a n .  K D D I  i s  a 
telecommunications operator and provides ISP 
ser vices. It has been the second largest since 
formed through the merger of KDD, DDI and IDO 
in 2000, and was distinguished from the other 
Japanese mobile network carriers by IS-95 based 
mobile wireless technology for 2.5G and 3G 
network ser vices, by which technology KDDI 
smoothly migrated from 2G to 3G. Softbank is a 
multinational conglomerate holding company and 
entered the market with the acquisition of the 
Japanese division of Vodafone in 2006. Though 
delayed in launching 3G mobile network service, it 
garnered attention with introducing the iPhone into 
the Japanese market for the first time in 2008, 
which provoked the proliferation of smartphones in 
the Japanese market. By investigating causal effects 
of mobile network service advancements over the 
competition of these three distinctive mobile 
network carriers, a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the evolution of the mobile network 
industry is expected to be achieved. 
This paper examines the causal relationships 
across the growth of mobile network services and 
the business performances of the three mobile 
network carriers by using panel data models and 
vector autoregressive models. The growth of mobile 
network services should heterogeneously influence 
the business performances of the three mobile 
network carriers; i.e., the introduction of some 
ser vice at a cer tain time favourably af fect one 
carrier, while unfavourably another.  This paper 
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provides quantitative evidence of the interdependence 
and an additional perspective for describing that 
interdependence in terms of multi-sided platform 
markets (e.g. Rochet, & Tirole, 2006; Royall & 
Sorenson, 2007), which are the main contributions 
of the paper.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains 
the data sources and the variables for estimation. 
Section 3 details the estimation results including 
the estimation methods used in this paper. They are 
explained in two parts: panel-data models and VAR 
models. It is followed by discussions of the 
estimation results with a brief conclusion. 
　2．Data description and descriptive statistics
Due to the limit of the data availability, this paper 
utilises quarterly or annual data of the time period 
from FY1995Q4 to FY2018Q4, during which the 
mobile Internet ser vices based on 2G mobile 
wireless networks were initiated,  3G/4G mobile 
wireless technology services were sequentially 
launched, the sales of smartphones shapely rose, 
and the mobile content/commerce businesses 
noticeably expanded. Key variable adopted for the 
analysis are as follows: the growth rates of the 
number of subscribers and ARPU of the mobile 
network carriers, the number of subscribers of 
2G/3G/4G mobile network services, the shipment 
volumes of the feature phone, the smartphone, and 
the iPhone, and the transaction volume of mobile 
content/commerce. Real Gross National Income 
(GNI) is also included as an income index. In 
addition, two kinds of dummy variables indicating 
the availability of the iPhone and the 3G/4G mobile 
service are defined; they take on the value zero for 
the period before the service is launched and the 
value one after the service is launched. 3G precedes 
the iPhone and the iPhone precedes 4G, so that 
these dummy variables have a proper inclusive 
relation.  The number of subscribers, market shares 
and APRUs represent the business performances of 
mobile network car riers; 2G/3G/4G mobile 
network services correspond to advances in the 
mobile wireless technology; the increase of the 
smar tphone shipment  indicates funct ional 
improvements of the mobile handsets available in 
the market; the expansion of the transaction 
volumes of mobile content/commerce illustrates 
the development of the mobile network applications 
and services. These variables, therefore, cover main 
constituents for capturing the evolution of the 
mobile telecommunications industr y in Japan 
(Krafft, 2003). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the variables and 
their statistics.  All variables except for the dummies 
are represented in natural logarithms. The statistics 
of ARPU are calculated on a quarterly basis from 
FY2000Q4 to FY2018Q4. Some figures of quarterly 
ARPUs are not available in public, so that they are 
smoothly interpolated with the annual data. The 
statistics for the mobile handsets and the mobile 
content/commerce services are calculated on an 
annual basis from FY2001 to FY2018.  
　3． Estimation methods and results of 
estimation
　3.1 Panel data analysis
For dealing with the heterogeneity of the mobile 
network carriers, this paper first conducts a panel 
data analysis. Table 2 shows the results of the 
pairwise Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel causality test 
applied to the quar terly panel  data,  where 
DLNSUBS, LNARPUR and DLNGNI correspond to 
the growth rates of the number of subscribers, 
ARPU, and the real GNI, respectively.  DIPH is a 
dummy variable indicating the availability of the 
iPhones. The causality direction is not symmetric; 
DLNSUB is correlated with the introduction of 3G 
mobile wireless ser vice, while LNARPUR is 
strongly correlated with the launch of the iPhone. 
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Table1  Summary of statistics for variables 
Quarterly        Mean        Max         Min.        Std. Dev.     Obs.
LNSUB_ (number of subscribers)/ LNSUBS (pooled/panel data)
DoCoMo 17.59206 18.17801 15.41186 0.585071 93
KDDI 16.99313 17.82693 15.22528 0.613298 93
Softbank 16.59537 17.54567 13.97508 0.829395 93
LNARPUR (growth rate of ARPU)
DoCoMo -0.00921 0.052041 -0.07791 0.021907 76
KDDI -0.00941 0.031499 -0.09471 0.022326 76
Softbank -0.00912 0.097878 -0.08976 0.033849 76
LNWRG (3G+4G)
DoCoMo 16.93026 18.17801 10.20359 1.945556 70
KDDI 17.12784 17.82693 13.9564 0.703969 68
Softbank 16.02454 17.54567 7.090077 2.226847 66
DIPH (dummy variable for the iPhone)
DoCoMo 0.236559 1 0 0.427273 93
KDDI 0.322581 1 0 0.469997 93
Softbank 0.462366 1 0 0.501284 93
DW3G_ (dummy variable for 3G)/ DWCDMA (pooled/panel data)
DoCoMo 0.752688 1 0 0.433788 93
KDDI 0.731183 1 0 0.445748 93
Softbank 0.709677 1 0 0.456371 93
DW4G_ (dummy variable for 4G)/ DLTE (pooled/panel data)
DoCoMo 0.365591 1 0 0.484206 93
KDDI 0.27957 1 0 0.45122 93
Softbank 0.27957 1 0 0.45122 93
LNGNI (real GNI)
 1.389618 1.49325 1.318856 0.048404 93
Annual        Mean        Max         Min.        Std. Dev.     Obs.
LNHAND (mobile handset)
 8.21861 8.518992 6.979145 0.317797 24
LNSMART (smartphone)
 6.980273 8.088869 3.044522 1.631631 12
LNIPH (iPone)
 6.601322 7.393878 4.110874 1.080923 11
LNCONT (mobile contents)
 8.587528 10.01059 6.175867 1.016831 19
LNCMRC (mobile commerce)
 8.807116 10.59516 4.691348 1.538835 19
Table 2  Pairwise Dumitrescu-Hurlin Panel Causality Tests
Independent
variables
lag=1 lag=2 lag=4
DLNSUBS LNARPUR DLNSUBS LNARPUR DLNSUBS LNARPUR
DLNSUBS       
LNARPUR   0.0027**  0.0277*  
DLNGNI     
DWCDMA 0.0368*  0.0025**  0.0154*  
DLTE  0.000**  0.000**  0.0398**
DIPH  0.000**  0.000**  0.0000**
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This suggests that there would be regime changes 
in the growth rates of the number of subscribers 
and ARPUs; the regime change of the former 
corresponds with the progress of the wireless 
mobile technology and that of the later with the 
expansion of smart phones, typically the iPhones. 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the 
fixed-effects and the dynamic panel data models, in 
which DLSNSUB is the dependent variable and the 
rest of the variables are the independent variables. 
Since the panel data studied in the paper have long 
time series for a small number of the cross sections, 
only the results of the fixed-ef fects estimation, 
together with those of pooled estimation as a 
reference, are listed. DLNSUBS is a seasonal 
variable, so that the quarterly dummy variables are 
also included into the estimation. Under the null 
hypothesis that there is no cross-section dependence 
in residuals, Pesaran scaled LM and Bias-corrected 
scaled LM tests indicate no significance, though 
Breusch-Pagan LM is significant at 10% level. 
Combined this result with the statistics of the F-test, 
the estimation of the fixed-estimation is considered 
as reliable.  The Wald-coefficient restriction test, 
however, shows a strong AR(1) correlation in the 
residual, so that the dynamic panel data model is 
more suitable.  Nevertheless, the results shown in 
Table 3 is consistent in that while the advance 
wireless mobile technology negatively affects the 
growth rates of the number of subscribers for the 
three mobile network carries, the launch of the 
iPhone positively does. These results illustrate the 
fact that the evolution of the wireless mobile 
ser vices strongly depends on not only the 
advancement of the wireless mobile technologies 
but also the that of the mobile handset functions. 
The former intensifies the competition between the 
mobile network carriers, and the later contributes 
to the development of the whole market. 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the fixed-
effect and the dynamic panel data analysis for the 
case that LNARPUR is the independent variable. 
LNARPUR is also a seasonal variable, so that the 
quarterly dummy variables are included into the 
estimation. The F-test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no fixed-effects between the mobile 
network carries, and thus the pooled estimates are 
convincing. LNARPUR positively correlates with 
GNI as well as DIPH, which are consistent among 
the estimation models. Since ARPU reflects the 
retail price of mobile ser vices, this result is 
reasonable.  
Table 5 and Table 6 are the results of the 
estimation based on the annual panel data, where 
DLNSMART, DLNCONT, DLNCMRC are the growth 
rates of the shipment volume of the smart phones, 
the market size of the mobile content, and the 
market size of the mobile commerce, respectively. 
DNLCONT and DLNCMRC are proxy variables 
representing the development of the upper-layer 
mobile network services. DLNSMART, on the other 
hand, reflects the advancement of the mobile 
handset functions. The upper-layer network 
ser vices and the mobile handset functions are 
complementar y in the evolution of the mobile 
te lecommunicat ions  ser v ices ;  wi thout  the 
emergence and proliferation of the mobile handsets 
with highly computational capabilities, attractive 
and sophisticated mobile network services are not 
diffused into the market.  
The results of Table 5 and Table 6 show that 
DLSMART is positively correlated with DLSUB, but 
negatively with LNARPU. DLNCMRC is also 
negatively correlated with LNARPU. These results 
indicate that as the smartphones spread into the 
market, the performance of ARPU is unfavourable 
for the carries, but the expansion of advanced 
mobile handsets drives the growth of the market. 
The Granger-causality test shows that DLNSMART 
and DLNCMRC have mutual Granger causality,
　3.2 VAR (Vector Auto-Regressive) analysis
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Table 3  Estimation results of panel data analysis in the case that DLNSUBS is the dependent variable.
Variables Pooled Fixed Effect Pooled Fixed Effect Dynamic Panel
DLNSUBS Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error       Coef.    Std. Error
L1. 0.5700 0.0393**
L2. 0.1426 0.0372**
LNARPUR 0.0039 0.0375** 0.0091* 0.0373** 0.0143 0.037** 0.0210* 0.0367** 0.0205 0.0091**
L1. 0.0408 0.0361** 0.0456* 0.0356** 0.0279 0.0157†*
L2. 0.0283 0.0354** 0.0309* 0.0350** 0.0055 0.0090**
DLNGNI 0.0167 0.0798** 0.0548* 0.0792** 0.0400 0.0786** 0.0299* 0.0776** 0.0451 0.0403**
DWCDMA -0.0222 0.0026** -0.0215* 0.0026** -0.0197 0.0029** -0.0186* 0.0029** -0.0032 0.0010**
DLTE -0.0113 0.0022** -0.0093* 0.0023** -0.0012 0.0022** -0.0095* 0.0022** -0.0029 0.0012**
DIPH 0.0086 0.0022** 0.0063* 0.0024** 0.0081 0.0022** 0.0053* 0.0023** 0.0013 0.0004**
F-test Prob. 0.063† F=2.79** 0.015* F=4.29**
Sargan test of overidentification restrictions 0.571 c2=202.711
†Significance at 10% level,   *Significance at 5% level,    **Significance at 1% level　
Table 4  Estimation results of panel data analysis in the case that LNARPUR is the dependent variable.
Variables Pooled Fixed Effect Pooled Fixed Effect Dynamic Panel
LNARPUR Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error     Coef.    Std. Error
L1. -0.145 0.0671†*
L2. 0.0389 0.0664**
DLNSUBS 0.0128 0.1216** 0.0301 0.1234** 0.0912 0.1737** 0.0997 0.1744** 0.1401 0.1821**
L1. -0.2905 0.1990** -0.2839 0.1994** -0.2673 0.2039**
L2. 0.2297 0.1724** 0.2372 0.1728** 0.2111 0.1742**
DLNGNI 0.5495 0.1390** 0.5512 0.1392** 0.5512 0.1393** 0.5537 0.1395** 0.6216 0.1407**
DWCDMA -0.0099 0.0054†* -0.0101 0.0054†* -0.009 0.0058** -0.0091 0.0059** -0.0157 0.0063**
DLTE 0.0033 0.0042** 0.0020 0.0044** 0.0036 0.0042** 0.0023 0.0044** 0.0027 0.0045**
DIPH 0.0106 0.0040** 0.1239 0.0038** 0.0104 0.0041** 0.0121 0.0044** 0.1334 0.0044**
Fixed Effect F-test Prob. 0.5082 F=0.58** 0.6800 F=0.5062
Sargan test of overidentification restrictions 0.5154 c2=205.5484
†Significance at 10% level,   *Significance at 5% level,    **Significance at 1% level　
Table 5  Estimation results of panel data analysis in the case that DLNSUBS is the dependent variable.
Variables Pooled Fixed Effect Pooled Fixed Effect Dynamic Panel
DLNSUBS Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error     Coef.    Std. Error
L1. 0.4653 0.2061*
L2. -0.1636 0.2065*
LNARPUR 0.4124 0.1687** 0.4052 0.1657** 0.4161 0.2152†* 0.3938 0.2126** 0.2921 0.2478*
L1. -0.0062 0.2083** 0.019 0.2051** 0.036 0.02006*
L2. 0.0002 0.1833** -0.0212 0.1804** -0.0815 0.1781*
DLNGNI 0.1868 0.3237** 0.2886 0.3218** 0.19 0.3481** 0.2839 0.3459** 0.446 0.3481*
DLNSMART 0.0513 0.0129** 0.0464 0.0129** 0.0513 0.0138** 0.0461 0.0139** 0.0274 0.0162†
DLNCONT 0.0213 0.0875** 0.0167 0.086** 0.021 0.021** 0.0114 0.1008** -0.0018 0.0999*
DLNCMRC 0.2602 0.1141** 0.2696 0.112** 0.2603 0.2603** 0.2734 0.1214** 0.1721 0.1382*
DIPH 0.052 0.0166** 0.0353 0.0187†* 0.0518 0.0176** 0.0352 0.0198†* 0.012 0.0219*
F-test Prob. 0.2234 F=1.60** 0.2516 F=1.47**
Sargan test of overidentification restrictions 0.6154 c2=17.5747
†Significance at 10% level,   *Significance at 5% level,    **Significance at 1% level　
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To evaluate the causal direction among the 
variables and estimate the impacts of the launch of 
3G/4G and the proliferation of the smartphones, 
especially the iPhones, on the business performances 
of the mobile network carries, VAR analysis is 
conducted. VAR model entails the following steps: a 
unit  root  test  is  per for med to identi ty  the 
stationarity of time series variables; then VAR 
models are constructed to ascertain the direction of 
causality between the variables and evaluate the 
effects of unit shocks in the variables. 
DLNSUB and LNARPUR are seasonal variables, 
so that a seasonal unit root test is adopted. Table 7 
shows the results of Taylor Variance Ratio test for 
stationary on DLNSUB and LNAPUR.  The results 
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 
significance level of 5%, so that a cointegrate test on 
DLNSUB and LNARPUR is not conducted. The 
following paragraphs present the results of VAR 
analysis.
Table 8 shows the results of the pairwise Granger 
causality tests.  DLNSUB of KDDI noticeably 
depends on the other variables. Since KDDI has 
been ranked second of the three carriers, it would 
be subject to changes of the market environments. 
The Granger causality relationships between 
LNARPURs and DIPHs of DoCoMo and KDDI are 
bidirectional, while DIPH of Softbank has no-
significant relationship to LNARPURs of the other 
carriers. DIPH of Softbank is strongly correlated 
with DLNWRG, the growth rate of 3G/4G services. 
In short, the launch of the iPhone by Softbank 
strongly coordinates with the demand of advanced 
wireless telecommunications technologies, but it 
has less effect on the fiscal performances of the 
other carries.  
Figure 1 depicts the impulse responses of 
DLNSUBs in the case when a one standard deviation 
shock occurred in the growth rate of the number of 
subscribers.  It can be seen in the figure that there 
are unidirectional causal effects among DLNSUBs; 
DLNSUBs of DoCoMo and Softbank receive less 
impacts from the DLNSUB shocks of the other 
network carries than from their own shocks, but 
DLNSUB of KDDI does more impact from the 
DLNSUB shocks of the other carriers than from its 
own DNLSUB shock;  besides,  DLNSUB of 
DoCoMo has a positive correlation with that of 
KDDI but  negative one with DLNSUB of Softbank. 
These features are consistent with the results of the 
Granger causality test.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of 
Table 6  Estimation results of panel data analysis in the case that LNARPUR is the dependent variable.
Variables Pooled Fixed Effect Pooled Fixed Effect Dynamic Panel
LNARPUR Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error     Coef. Std. Error
L1. 0.3821 1.644**
L2. -0.2211 1.596**
DLNSUBS 0.4534 0.1854** 0.4924 0.2013** 0.3047 0.2212** 0.3532 0.2121** 0.2508 0.2157**
L1. -0.0175 0.2298** 0.0028 0.2196** 0.0227 0.222**
L2. 0.327 0.1635†* 0.4714 0.1712** 0.373 0.1757**
DLNGNI 0.0966 0.341** 0.0464 0.3605** 0.2491 0.3489** 0.163 0.3352** -0.0021 0.3421**
DLNSMART -0.0546 0.0134** -0.0541 0.0137** -0.05 0.0132** -0.0466 0.0127** -0.0369 0.0136**
DLNCONOT -0.0375 0.0914** -0.3601 0.0941** -0.0595 0.083** -0.0645 0.0832** -0.0949 0.091**
DLNCMRC -0.3915 0.0162** -0.4009 0.1103** -0.3874 0.1033** -0.4204 0.0999** -0.2891 0.1160**
DIPH -0.0206 0.02** -0.0163 0.2189** -0.0202 0.0201** -0.0057 0.0198†* -0.0028 0.021**
F-test Prob. 0.3 F=0.7430 0.1337 F=2.21**
Sargan test of overidentification restrictions 0.6472 c2=17.089
† Significance at 10% level,   *Significance at 5% level,    **Significance at 1% level　
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Table 8  Results from the pairwise Granger causality tests
Dependent  Vars.
Independent Vars.
DLNSUB_ LNARPUR_ DNLWRG
DoCoMo KDDI Softbank DoCoMo KDDI Softbank DoCoMo KDDI Softbank
DLNSUB_ DoCoMo  (†,**,*) (**,*,*)  (-,†,-) (†,*,-)  (-,*,**)  
KDDI (**,**,-) (*,**,-) (-,-,†)  (**,-,-) (-,†,**) (**,*,**)
Softbank (**,**,-) (-,*,*)      (*.†,-)  
LNARPUR_ DoCoMo  (-,†,*)    (-,-,*)  (-,-,**)  
KDDI (*,*,*) (-,*,**)  (-,*,**) (*,**,**)  (*,*,**)  
Softbank (†,-,-) (-,*,**)  (-,-,**)    (-,†,**)  
DLNWRG_ DoCoMo (†,-,-) (**,**,*)      (*,**,**) (**,**,**)
KDDI  (*,*,**)    (**,**,**) (*,-,**)
Softbank  (-,-,*)     (**,**,**) (**,-,†)  
DW3G_ DoCoMo (-,-,**) (*,**,-) (**,†,†)      
KDDI  (-,*,-) (*,†,†)   (**,**,-)  
Softbank  (-,*,-) (**,-,†)    (**,-,-)   
DW4G_ DoCoMo    (†,**,-) (-,**,*)    (**,*,-)
KDDI   (†, -,*) (*,**,**)   (**,-,-)
Softbank    (†,-,*) (*,**,**)   (**,-,-) (*,-,-)
DIPH_ DoCoMo    (*,**,*) (*,**,-)    (**,-,-)
KDDI   (*,*,-) (*,*,**)  (**,-,-) (**,-,-)
Softbank (-,†,-)     (-,-,**) (**,-,-) (**,*,-) (**,**,-)
DLNGNI          
(lag=1, lag=2, lag=4)
− No siginificance, † Significance at 10% level,   *Significance at 5% level,    **Significance at 1% level　
Table 7  Results from the Taylor variance ratio test (seasonal unit root test)
variables VR Stat. 1% 5% 10%
DLNSUB_ DoCoMo 0.005351 ** 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
 KDDI 0.010682 ** 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
 Softbank 0.005053 ** 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
LNARPUR_ DoCoMo 0.013083 * 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
 KDDI 0.012351 * 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
 Softbank 0.014134 * 0.01184 0.01864 0.02442
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DLNSUBs to one standard deviation shocks of 
DIPHs.  DLNSUB of DoCoMo positively reacts to 
DIPH shock of its own, but DLNSUBs of the other 
carriers negatively react to DIPH shock of their 
own. In addition, DLNSUB of KDDI receives strong 
negative impacts from DIPH shock of Softbank, and 
DLNSUB of Softbank does negative long-run effects 
from DIPH shocks of DoCoMo and KDDI. This 
result indicates that the market leader, DoCoMo, is 
hardly affected by the other carriers’ activities, but 
the rest of competitors are rather fragile; they 
influence each other.  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the historical 
decomposition of DSLUBs to the contribution of the 
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shocks of DNLSMART and DLNCMRC.  In these 
figures, asymmetric causal relationships between 
DNLSMART/DLNCMRC and DLSUBs of the three 
ne twork  car r ies  a r e  a l so  obser ved .   The 
DLNSMAR T shock gives a positive impact on 
DSLSUB of DoCoMo over the estimation period, 
but does negative impacts on DLNSUBs of KDDI 
and Softbank. Moreover, the DLNMRC shock gives 
a positive impact on DLNSUB of DoCoMo after 
2014, while it does a partially fluctuating impact on 
DLNSUB of KDDI and a fractional impact on 
DLSNSUB of Softbank.
The above results indicate that DLNSUBs of the 
three mobile network carries are asymmetrically 
influenced to some extent by the growth rate of the 
number of subscribers of the other carriers, the 
launch of the iPhones, the grow rate of the 
shipment volume of the smar tphones, and the 
market size of the mobile commerce, and that the 
extent of the influence which a network carrier 
receives depends on the market position of the 
network carrier; DLNSUB of the leader carrier 
receives positive or small impacts while DLNSUB of 
the intermediates do fluctuating impacts.    
　4. Discussion and Conclusion
A summary of the estimation results is as follows: 
(1) DoCoMo, the largest carrier, has remained its 
market position as the market has developed 
through the advance in the mobile wireless 
technologies, the expansion of the mobile content 
and commerce markets, and the proliferation of the 
high functioning mobile handsets; (2) the growth 
rates of the number of subscribers and ARPU of 
DoCoMo has been coordinated with those of the 
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whole market. DoCoMo has been less influenced 
than the other carriers by the changes of the 
market environments; (3) KDDI, the second largest 
carrier, has been largely affected on its business 
per formances with the progress of both the 
wireless technologies and the smartphones; (4) 
Softbank, the third largest carrier, provoked the 
dif fusion of the smartphones by introducing the 
iPhone and induced the structure changes of the 
market, but it did not improve its market position; 
(5) the first release of the iPhone by Softbank 
significantly Granger causes the growth rate of the 
number of subscribers of 3G/4G, ; (6) the progress 
of the smar tphones has been an impor tant 
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complement to that of the mobile commerce 
market.
The first and second results are par tially 
consistent with the phenomenon observed in the 
European mobile telecommunications industry, 
where the incumbent remained the largest operator 
in the transition period from 2G to 3G. While in the 
European countries the incumbents defended their 
market standing through delaying their own 
migration to 3G (Walley & Curwen, 2012), DoCoMo 
kept its position in the transition period from 2G to 
3G with initiating the migration ahead of its 
competitors. The dominant market share over 45% 
and the abundant constant R&D investment on 
mobile wireless technologies could explain the 
reason why DoCoMo has continued to be the 
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largest and has not received negative impacts 
through the industr y evolution. The third and 
fourth results show that that the evolution of the 
market provides asymmetric influences on the 
carriers; the release of the iPhone by Softbank 
negatively affected KDDI’s performances in short 
run, but it did not in long run, and also was 
unilateral; the release of the iPhone by KDDI did 
not significantly af fect Softbank’s performances. 
The release of the iPhone by DoCoMo negatively 
af fected Softbank’s per formances, but did not 
KDDI’s. Moreover, the expansion of 3G worked 
more favourably for KDDI with compared to 
Softbank. The fifth and sixth results accords with 
the findings of the research on the role of mobile 
handsets in the mobile network evolution (Ono & 
Tang, 2010). The mobile handsets have functions 
terminating the mobile network services, so that 
the progress of the handsets is indispensable for 
the proliferation of advanced and sophisticate 
mobile network services. 
From the viewpoint of the platform competition 
theor y (Just, 2018; Zhu & Iansiti, 2012), the 
competition among the three mobile network 
carriers for the target period of this study can be 
explained based on three views of installed base, 
indirect network effects, and consumers’ discount 
factor of future applications. Reviewing the 
estimation summar y, it is concluded that the 
competition among the three carriers is driven by 
installed base with the moderate strength of indirect 
network effects. Incumbents, therefore, are likely to 
dominate the markets, and their leadership 
positions with first-move advantages is difficult to 
dislodge. Since the mobile wireless technologies 
are du jure standardised, consumers’ discount 
factor of the future wireless technologies is small, 
and the market dynamics are scarcely driven by the 
network quality.  
On the other hand, consumer’s discount factor 
would be valid for mobile network services offered 
through the mobile handsets; applications with a 
small quality advantage could achieve larger market 
shares due to indirect network effects and forward-
looking behaviour of consumers. The impacts of the 
iPhones and the smar tphones on the financial 
performances of the mobile network carriers could 
be caused by quality driven competition among 
platforms offered by the mobile network carriers 
and the mobile handset vendors. Before the 
iPhones and the smartphones are released in the 
market, the mobile network carriers had dominant 
market power over the mobile handset vendors. 
However, as the functional capabilities of mobile 
handsets progress, their market power would be 
weakened.  The invest igat ion behind these 
mechanisms is left for future research.
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